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The Legacy of Matsushita: The Role of
Economics in Antitrust Litigation
Michael A. Salinger*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Matsushita,1 two U.S. electronics companies brought suit against,
in effect, seven Japanese electronics manufacturers for collusively
engaging in predatory pricing. The massive record compiled in the case
apparently contained no direct evidence of the sort of conspiracy that
could have led to damages to be owed to plaintiffs. While the record
arguably did contain circumstantial evidence of such a conspiracy, the
Court did not allow a jury to decide whether that evidence was
sufficient. In granting appellants' motion for summary judgment, it
ruled, "[I]f the factual context renders respondents' claims
implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense-
respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to
support their claim than would otherwise be necessary." 2 According to
the Court, there were two aspects of the case that were particularly
implausible. The period of predation supposedly began in 1953, more
than twenty years before the case was filed. Even if the Japanese
companies were eventually to drive U.S. firms from the market, the
present value of the entire strategy must have been negative. Moreover,
however implausible the predation strategy would have been for a
single dominant firm, the allegation was that all the companies had
colluded in the predatory scheme. This would have required the cartel
to be stable for decades. The members would have had to agree on both
the allocation of losses during the predation period and the allocation of
gains in the post-predation period.
IDirector, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission and Professor of Economics, Boston
University School of Management. This paper represents the views of the author and not
necessarily those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. It is
adapted from a speech at the "Matsushita at 20" conference sponsored by the Institute for
Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola University Law School, September 29, 2006. I thank Liz
Callison, Diana Cowen, Mike Vita, Josh Soven, and Nandu Machiraju for their help and insights.
1. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
2. Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
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Matsushita occurred at a time of long-standing concerns that certain
aspects of antitrust policy were fundamentally misguided and that
economic analysis could be a powerful analytical tool for distinguishing
between sound and counterproductive policies. Economics had been a
part of antitrust litigation before the decision, but Matsushita was a key
step in giving economics a greater role. That role is now widely
accepted in the United States, in Europe, and arguably in much of the
world.3 Yet, despite the apparent agreement on the broad principle that
antitrust policy should be economically sound, there remains
controversy over exactly what that principle implies either for policy or
for the resolution of any particular case. One reading of Matsushita is
that it requires an antitrust case to be supported by a formal economic
model. In the years since Matsushita, the economic modeling used in
antitrust cases has become increasingly sophisticated technically; and
this increased use of formal economic tools is arguably part of the
legacy of Matsushita. Yet, while Matsushita clearly lays out an
increased role for economics, the use of a formal model as the
centerpiece of a predation claim may not necessarily be the role implied
by the decision.
The specific allegation in Matsushita was collusive predation. The
legacy of the increased role the decision gives to economics extends far
beyond that specific issue to virtually every area of antitrust law. The
biggest impact, however, was on predatory pricing doctrine. This
article describes the evolution of predatory pricing doctrine since
Matsushita with a focus both on the role economics has played and on
the role it should play in predatory pricing cases.
Part II of this article discusses the Matsushita decision itself. It
argues that the decision can be read to create two possible roles for
economics. One, henceforth the "microanalytic" role, would be to
present each case in terms of a formal economic model. In contrast, a
"decision theoretic" role would entail creating simple rules based on the
recognition that economic analysis is inherently imprecise and that
errors are inevitable. Part III explores the possible microanalytic role
for economics in more detail. Drawing on game theory, 4 it argues that
the "no economic sense" screen in predation cases is inherently coarse.
It can properly rule out allegations like those in Matsushita, but there
are likely to be cases in which a wide range of behavior could make
3. See infra Part II (discussing Matsushita's influence on the role of economics in antitrust
litigation).
4. See infra Part III (describing game theory).
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economic sense. Part IV then turns to Brooke Group,5 which seems to
place extra emphasis on a microanalytic role for economics. Part IV
argues, however, that the Court might have gone beyond what can be
said as a matter of economics in dismissing the allegations on the
grounds that recoupment was not plausible. Part V then turns to two
recent cases involving the airline industry-the Department of Justice's
predatory pricing case against American Airlines, 6 and Spirit Airlines'
predatory pricing case against Northwest.7 These cases illustrate how
the courts' ability to use economics appropriately in its decision
theoretic role has been limited by academic neglect of the cost issues
central to those cases.
II. THE LEGACY OF MATSUSHITA
Matsushita contained two key phrases (or, more accurately, sets of
phrases) with respect to the role of economics in antitrust cases. The
first set, which was quoted in the introduction, linked the plausibility of
a claim to whether it makes economic sense. The second set contains
the assertions that "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even
more rarely successful" 8 and that "mistaken inferences in cases such as
this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect." 9
With these statements, the Court acknowledged that courts and juries
would sometimes make mistakes in deciding whether predation had
occurred and that the possibility of such mistakes affects legal
standards. With a perfect test for predation, we would not need to
worry whether predation was rare or about the cost of confusing
competition with predation. When predation occurred, it would be
punished. Absent such a test, however, the legal standard should
rationally take account both of the relative frequency of anticompetitive
price reductions (compared with those that are just good, clean
competition) as well as the cost of falsely labeling a competitive price
cut as predatory. 10
5. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
6. United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cit. 2003). The district court decision is
found at 140 F. Supp 2d. 1141 (D. Kan. 2001).
7. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005).
8. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589.
9. Id. at 594.
10. Keith N. Hylton and Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic
Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001) as well as James C. Cooper, Luke Froeb, Daniel P.
O'Brien & Michael Vita, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS.
ORG. 639 (2005).
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As important as Matsushita was, it left some important questions
unanswered. It set out a two-pronged test for demonstrating predation.
Plaintiffs must demonstrate pricing below the "appropriate measure of
cost,"11 and must demonstrate that the alleged predator had a reasonable
prospect of recoupment. 12 The appropriate measure of cost remains a
large, open question. 13
The Court also gave little guidance as to the standards for
demonstrating the plausibility of recoupment. The claims in Matsushita
were so preposterous that there was no need to discuss details at that
time. Any remotely plausible approach would give the answer that
recoupment after a twenty-year predation period is implausible. From
the decision itself, it is hard to know whether the "economic sense"
screen was intended as a fine screen in which a professional economist
would be needed to make the call, or whether it would be a kind of
"sanity check" that would not require much in the way of formal
economic tools. One might expect that as economic analysis becomes
more sophisticated, the screen could become increasingly fine; and
perhaps it will. The approach economists use to analyze market settings
with a small number of firms-"game theory"-is, however, inherently
imprecise and may only be capable of providing a coarse screen.
III. INHERENT LIMITS OF THE "No ECONOMIC SENSE SCREEN"
For an economist, the requirement that a claim in a case make
economic sense means that one can construct a formal economic model
of the claim. The Court might not have explicitly intended the
statement to refer to mathematical models, but the implication is
unavoidable. To demonstrate that an antitrust claim makes economic
sense, one must show that the defendant would have found the alleged
anticompetitive behavior to be profitable. Such a conclusion could only
rest on a computation of profits that would require estimates of costs,
quantities sold, and prices received. In turn, costs, quantities sold, and
prices are necessarily interrelated because of constraints imposed by
market demand and competitive interaction. Any computation of the
profitability of a particular action requires estimates of and/or
assumptions about these interrelationships.
Determining these interrelationships is complicated by a variety of
factors. One is that direct observation of demand and cost relationships
is generally not possible. In any particular market, there is a price
11. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584 n.8.
12. Id. at 589.
13. See infra Part V (discussing the difficulty of ascertaining costs).
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charged and quantity demanded. Even if these are observable, the
counterfactual of what demand would have been under a different price
is not. Similarly, even if the costs incurred by a firm to generate output
are available, what costs would have been if the quantity sold were
different is not. Yet, while direct observation of the counterfactuals is
not possible, economists have techniques for estimating demand and
cost functions. While such estimates must rest on assumptions-and
different economists might make different judgments about which
assumptions are most appropriate-demand and cost estimation are the
very stuff that economics as a discipline is about.
A deeper problem with determining whether an allegation makes
economic sense is that a firm gauges the profitability of an action by
how it expects its rivals to respond. The economic approach to
understanding expectations would be to assume that each firm expects
other firms to behave in their own economic interest, But the behavior
of other firms in turn depends on their own expectations. The problem
is the province of game theory. 14 Some economists would argue that
the solution is to look for the suitable Nash equilibrium.15 Despite the
extensive effort economists have devoted to this general problem-an
effort that no doubt rivals the effort lawyers put into presenting the
Matsushita case-they simply cannot narrow the possibilities very
much.
To understand this point, some elaboration on the nature of game
theory is necessary. The "prisoner's dilemma" is a good place to start,
as it is the game with which most people are familiar. Two people, A
and B, are arrested, put into separate rooms, and given the choice of
either confessing or not confessing. If neither confesses, they both go to
jail for one year (on some minor charge). If both confess, they both go
to jail for 10 years. If A confesses and B does not, A gets off entirely
while B goes to jail for 15 years. The reverse happens if B confesses
and A does not. The following "game matrix" represents the problem:
14. See ROBERT G. GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS (1992) (introducing
game theory and its economic applications).
15. A Nash equilibrium is a set of actions in which the decision made by each party is optimal
conditional on the actions of the others.
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Like any game representation, the above matrix identifies the players
(A and B), their possible strategies (Confess, Don't Confess), and the
payoffs to each player for each possible combination of strategies. In
the cells containing two numbers, the first is the payoff to player A
while the second is the payoff to player B. These payoffs are
represented as negative numbers to suggest that the payoffs in this
case-years in jail-are bad, not good.
In this game, both players have an incentive to confess. Regardless
of whether A confesses, B gets less jail time if he confesses; and the
same is true for A. Since B has a clear incentive to confess, A can
reasonably predict that B will confess and then make his choice based
on that assumption. The same is true for B. Both players confessing is
the unique Nash equilibrium in this model. A Nash equilibrium is one
in which the action chosen by each player maximizes his own payoff
given what the other player does. A's choice to confess is what is best
for him, given that B confesses. True, both players would be better off
if neither confessed, but that outcome would not be a Nash equilibrium.
For example, if B chooses not to confess, A is still better off confessing
(and getting off without any jail time) rather than not confessing (and
spending one year in jail).
Despite its simplicity, the prisoner's dilemma provides great insight
into a remarkably large number of situations. It applies to any situation
in which two or more parties each can choose to behave cooperatively
or selfishly. If the game is to be played only once, everyone's incentive
is to be selfish. In such cases, the analysis of the game serves two
proper roles for economic theory. First, it provides a basis for
predicting that the outcome will be confession by both parties. Like any
prediction, of course, there is no guarantee that it will turn out to be
correct, but predicting that people will act in their own interest is likely
to provide a more accurate forecast than predicting that they will act
against their own interest. Second, it provides guidance to individuals
as to what they should do if they find themselves in a setting that can be
characterized as a single-play prisoner's dilemma. If the solution to all
games was like the prisoner's dilemma, game theory would be a more
powerful tool than it is. 16
Many games are, however, different in an important way from the
prisoner's dilemma. Consider the game traditionally referred to as
16. In both real and experimental settings with a prisoner's dilemma payoff structure, people
cooperate even when they seem to have an incentive not to. Often, though, the cooperation arises
when the game is repeated. See ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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"Battle of the Sexes." 17 As the story behind the game is typically told, a
husband and wife wish to meet, but have not agreed on the location and
have no means of communication. They both know that the alternatives
are the baseball game and the opera. Whichever event they attend, they
want to go together. That is, if the husband knew that the wife was
going to the opera, he would go to the opera; if he knew she was going
to the baseball game, he would go to the baseball game. Both spouses
enjoy both events, but the husband likes the baseball game more while
the wife prefers the opera. If we measure the payoffs as "utility"'18
levels, the game matrix could be:
Wife
Baseball Game Opera
Baseball Game 2, 1 0, 0
Husband Opera 0,0 1,2
As with the prisoner's dilemma, Battle of the Sexes is of interest not
because of its literal application but because it has structure that
corresponds to many real-world situations. The two parties have an
incentive to coordinate, but they have different preferences about what
they would coordinate on.
In contrast to the prisoner's dilemma, there are two Nash equilibria in
Battle of the Sexes. 19 One is that both go to the opera. If the husband
goes to the opera, the wife's best option is to go to the opera. If the wife
goes to the opera, the husband's best option is to go to the opera. Thus,
when both go to the opera, each is making the best choice (from a
selfish standpoint) given the action of the other. Using the same logic,
it is also a Nash equilibrium for both to go to the baseball game.
20
Even though two outcomes satisfy the definition of a Nash
equilibrium, there is no particular reason to believe that either would
17. DREw FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 18-20 (1991).
18. Utility is a measure of well-being in the sense that, given a choice generating different
utilities, an individual chooses the one with the higher utility.
19. To be more precise, there are two Nash equilibria in "pure strategies." If the players are
allowed "mixed strategies," which means that they can pick each strategy with any probability,
there is a third equilibrium. Consideration of mixed strategies does not alter the points made here
about the Battle of the Sexes game.
20. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the husband goes to the ball game with probability 2/3
and to the opera with probability 1/3. The wife does the reverse. This outcome meets the
mathematical definition of an equilibrium, but is unstable and therefore an even less credible
basis for predicting what will happen than the pure strategy equilibria.
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occur (absent explicit communication between the parties). Without
knowing which of the two equilibria will prevail, neither party can
know whether to go the baseball game or the opera. As a result, there
does not seem to be any way to rule out the possibility that, say, the
husband would go to the baseball game and the wife would go to the
opera even though that outcome would not satisfy the definition of an
equilibrium.
In the prisoner's dilemma, the Nash equilibrium is compelling
because there is a single Nash equilibrium.21 In contrast, when there are
multiple Nash equilibria (and no obvious way for the parties to focus on
one as being most likely),22 the parties might have different
expectations about which equilibrium will prevail, in which case the
outcome might not be an equilibrium at all. Indeed, if a player
recognizes that the multiplicity of equilibria makes it possible that the
outcome will not be an equilibrium, he might make a choice that is not
part of any Nash equilibrium.
23
In most market settings, the interaction between competitors is
repeated over time. It is therefore natural to model market interaction as
a repeated game. Even games that have a single Nash equilibrium when
played just once can have multiple equilibria when they are repeated.24
Multiple equilibria should be viewed as the norm for many types of
market settings in which game theory might seem applicable; and, as a
result, economic theory does not generate a clear prediction about what
the outcome will be.
The fact that game theory does not provide precise predictions about
market outcomes or what constitutes optimal behavior severely restricts
the limitations imposed by the requirement that an allegation of
predatory pricing must make economic sense. The requirement can
properly be the basis for dismissing allegations as extreme as those in
21. Actually, the prisoner's dilemma has an additional unusual feature that makes the Nash
equilibrium even more compelling. Each player has a single strategy that is best regardless of
what the other player does. Such a strategy is known as a dominant strategy. In most games,
players do not have a dominant strategy.
22. For example, suppose both husband and wife preferred the baseball game so that they both
got a utility of 2 when both went to the game and they both got a utility of 1 if both went to the
opera. With this change, there are still two Nash equilibria, but one might expect that both would
go to the baseball game. In the language of game theory, the equilibrium in which both go to the
baseball game "Pareto dominates" the one in which both go to the opera; and the exclusion of
"dominated strategies" is referred to as a "refinement." As the original Battle of the Sexes game
illustrates, however, this refinement does not always result in a unique equilibrium.
23. B. Douglas Bernheim, Rationalizeable Strategic Behavior, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1007, 1010
(1984).
24. Ariel Rubinstein, Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion, 21 J. ECON.
THEORY 1 (1979).
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Matsushita. But one should expect that there would be many cases
where it would be much harder to dismiss a predation claim on the
grounds that, as a matter of economics, the prospects for recoupment
were implausible.
IV. BROOKE GROUP
In Brooke Group, the Supreme Court extended the economic sense
screen of Matsushita beyond the realm of cases involving no direct
evidence of the alleged behavior. In contrast to Matsushita, there was
evidence in Brooke Group that Brown & Williamson (B&W) attempted
predatory pricing. If the Supreme Court was correct when it said in
Matsushita "that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even
more rarely successful,"'25 then Brooke Group involves a rare case in
which a company attempted such a scheme. B&W lowered prices on its
generic cigarettes below average variable cost for a period of between
12 and 18 months, and its intent in doing so was to persuade Liggett
either to stop selling generic cigarettes or at least to get it to charge
higher prices for them. As the trial court ruled, the documents written
by top B&W executives "indicating B & W's anticompetitive intent...
are more voluminous and detailed than any other reported case. This
evidence not only indicates B & W wanted to injure Liggett, it also
details an extensive plan to slow the growth of the generic cigarette
segment." 26
In Brooke Group, the appellate court had ruled that a successful
predatory pricing claim could not rest on the need for oligopolistic
coordination on prices in the recoupment period. It went so far as to say
such a theory defies "economic logic." 27 The Supreme Court correctly
disagreed with that assertion, instead ruling that such theories are
logical but unlikely. It ruled, however, that "when the realities of the
market and the record facts indicate that it has occurred and was likely
to have succeeded, theory will not stand in the way of liability."
28
The question raised by Brooke Group is, if evidence of actual
expectations of recoupment are not sufficient to demonstrate
recoupment, then what in addition to company documents would be
necessary? There would seem to be only a few possibilities. One
25. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
26. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 354
(M.D.N.C. 1990).
27. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 341 (4th Cir.
1992).
28. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 229 (1993).
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would be that plaintiff must demonstrate actual recoupment. Indeed,
that would seem to be a plausible interpretation of the phrase, "the
realities of the market and the record facts indicate it has occurred ......
Such a standard could conceivably be justified on decision-theoretic
grounds. Requiring actual recoupment would necessarily create some
risk of false negatives, as it is certainly possible for a company to have a
reasonable expectation that predation would be profitable only to have
unexpected events make the company ultimately regret its attempt.
Still, if the costs of false positives are sufficiently great relative to the
cost of false negatives, then that risk might be worth taking.
Whether or not the Court intended the standard to require a
demonstration of actual recoupment, there remains the requirement of
demonstrating that recoupment was likely to succeed.29 Because B&W
attempted predatory pricing, it must have expected to succeed. So the
Court decided that the judgment of the company did not settle the issue.
Instead, it substituted its own judgment. Presumably, it intended courts
to rely at least in part on expert economic testimony to reach such
judgments. Yet it might be relatively rare for expectations of
recoupment to be so implausible that they can be dismissed as making
no economic sense.30
To the extent that the Court focused on the need for price
coordination among tobacco companies in Brooke Group, it is not clear
why it would have found such coordination so implausible ex ante. The
industry had a long history of price coordination.31 In merger analysis,
evidence of past coordination is arguably the factor deemed most
important for predicting whether future coordination is likely. 32  The
Court was arguably on firmer ground when it observed that the success
of B&W's predation required that it be able to raise the price of generic
cigarettes above competitive levels. The successful coordination in the
past had rested on the presence of entry barriers, 33 but those barriers
29. Either the phrase "the realities of the market and the record facts indicate it has occurred"
required a demonstration of actual recoupment, or it did not. If it did, one must still contend with
the phrase "and was likely to have succeeded." Alternatively, if "it" in the above phrase merely
referred to the attempt at predation, then there remains the requirement of a showing that the
attempt was likely to succeed.
30. See supra Part II (discussing the limitations of game theory in making precise predictions
about market outcomes).
31. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 213; FED. TRADE COMM'N, 105TH CONG., REPORT ON
COMPETITION AND THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED TOBACCO INDUSTRY
SETTLEMENT 1-13 (1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/tobacco/ndoc95.pdf.
32. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
22-24 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.pdf.
33. JOSEPH S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND
CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 144-66 (1956).
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may have restricted entry into the branded segment. 34 Whether there
were any barriers to generic entry is less clear. Still, the implication that
economic expert testimony should be used to second-guess the clear
expectations of the company might be placing far too much faith in the
precision with which economic analysis can pinpoint what makes
economic sense when allegations of predation are at issue.
V. RECENT AIRLINES CASES
The argument is not to suggest that the Matsushita Court's faith in
economics was inherently misplaced. While the wide range of possible
outcomes in game-theoretic situations limits (but does not eliminate
altogether) the importance of the microanalytic role for economics,
economics still has an important role in formulating and implementing
standards based on decision theory.
Recall that decision theory starts from the proposition that judicial
mistakes are inevitable. This basic insight is fundamental to
understanding standards for establishing a predatory pricing claim. If
there were no judicial uncertainty, the standards for predation would be
much different from those the Court laid down in Matsushita and
Brooke Group. In a world of certainty, predation might well be defined
as charging any price below the one that maximizes short run profits if
the intent of doing so is to exclude or limit the rate of entry. 35 It would
be possible in such a world to bring a predation case even if the
company was charging a price above any measure of its own costs.
The requirement that plaintiff demonstrate pricing below the
"relevant measure of cost" can only be justified on the basis of decision
theory. The decision not to adopt what is known more generally as the
"profit sacrifice" 36 standard for predatory pricing is presumably in part
due to the difficulty of administering such a standard. It would require
ascertaining exactly what the short-run, profit-maximizing price is,
something that courts would have extreme difficulty doing even with
the aid of expert economists. Moreover, the standard is motivated in
34. BAIN, supra note 33. Bain identified three classes of entry barriers: scale economies,
absolute cost advantages, and product differentiation. Of these, product differentiation is likely
the most important in cigarettes.
35. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing
and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981). The authors argue that this should be the
appropriate conceptual standard for defining predation in general. It is not, however, the standard
used for predatory pricing.
36. A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct-
Are There Unifying Principles? 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 389-403 (2006) (describing the sacrifice
test and discussing its merits and drawbacks).
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part by a recognition that false positives in predatory pricing cases have
high costs because they can chill the competitive conduct that the
antitrust laws are intended to promote. The "below the relevant notion
of cost" standard is an example of what is known more generally as a
"no economic sense test."'37 The idea is to have a class of behavior that
qualitatively would make no economic sense unless it had the effect of
excluding competitors. Properly applied, such a standard creates a low
risk of false positives, but it does not rule out the possibility altogether
of a successful predatory pricing case.
Applying the test, however, requires determining the proper notion of
costs. The Court did not resolve the relevant notion of cost in
Matsushita nor has it done so since. In this regard, developments in the
economics profession in the twenty years since Matsushita (as well as
the ten years prior to the decision) have not been as helpful as they
might have been. Much attention over this time period has been
devoted to game theoretic analysis of markets. Little has been paid to
more basic cost analysis. 38 At one time, much of industrial economics
started from the premise that competition drives prices down to
marginal cost and then proceeded to measure deviations from
competition with price-cost margins.39 That approach fell out of favor
in large part because of the difficulty of measuring the relevant notion
of cost. Those difficulties are real. Yet, the reaction among industrial
economists has been to neglect the measurement of cost altogether.
That reaction is most unfortunate, as courts hearing antitrust cases are in
need of proper cost analysis. Two relatively recent cases, both
involving the airline industry, illustrate this point.
A. American Airlines
The American Airlines case concerned the response of American
Airlines to entry by low-cost carriers on routes to and from its Dallas-
Fort Worth hub between 1995 and 1997. The typical pattern was that
American cut and expanded the availability of its discounted fairs and
37. See Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The "No
Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 413-33 (2006).
38. "Firms' price-cost margins are not taken to be observables; economic marginal cost (MC)
cannot be directly or straightforwardly observed. The analyst infers MC from firm behavior, uses
differences between closely related markets to trace the effects of changes in MC, or comes to a
quantification of market power without measuring cost at all." Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical
Studies of Industries With Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011,
1012-13 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1992).
39. Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 951, 951-1001 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
Willig eds., 1992).
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expanded its capacity by adding flights and increasing the size of the
planes it used. When the entrants subsequently exited, American raised
its fares back to previous levels and removed the added capacity from
the routes.
The district court ruled for American Airlines on the grounds that
plaintiffs had not demonstrated pricing below the relevant measure of
cost, finding that none of the cost measures put forward was the right
one.40 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld that
decision.4 1 The decisions of both courts reflect fundamental confusion
about the nature of costs.
Conceptually, one wants to ascertain whether a company charged
prices below the incremental costs per unit of providing the output sold
at those prices. Doing so is rarely simple, and it is probably particularly
complicated in the airline industry. Areeda and Turner's classic 1975
article on the subject argued for using average variable cost as a proxy
for short-run marginal cost.42  From the start, the article was
controversial, eliciting criticism from, among others, F.M. Scherer, and
alternative recommendations from Oliver Williamson and William
Baumol.43  These criticisms notwithstanding, the Areeda-Turner
standard has been highly influential. Notably, the Supreme Court has
failed to endorse it, and, as the American Airlines case illustrates, with
good reason.
One problem is that, as the Areeda-Turner rule is implemented,
average variable cost means average variable accounting costs, which is
different from average variable economic costs. To take a specific
example, the government proposed various cost measures that included
airplane expense. The district court in the case ruled, "Aircraft
ownership costs are properly considered fixed costs in the industry, and
are not an avoidable cost of changing capacity in a route."'44 This
statement is simply wrong as a matter of economics. If American
increased the number of available seat miles as part of its response, then
the airplanes were an input that varied with the level of output. Exactly
40. United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1199 (D. Kan. 2001) [hereinafter
American Airlines 1].
41. United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
American Airlines II].
42. Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
43. F. M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv.
869 (1976); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
L.J. 284 (1977); William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for
Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979).
44. American Airlines 1, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
20071
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
how those costs should be measured may not be a simple matter. The
answer would be different in a period like the late 1980s, when airlines
had invested in far too much capacity and were retiring aircraft, than it
was in the late 1990s.4
5
Another general problem is that a company uses many inputs for
multiple "products." If the activity driving the cost is hard to identify, it
might be labeled as "joint" (and, therefore, "fixed") for accounting
purposes. In an economic sense, though, a cost is joint between two
activities only if the firm must incur the entire cost if it engages in just
one of the activities, and the marginal cost associated with the second
activity is zero. For example, the price of a football ticket would be a
joint cost if one were to think of viewing the first half of the game and
the second half as joint activities. Many costs that have traditionally
been treated as "joint" for accounting purposes are not joint in the
economic sense. The field of "activity-based costing,'"46 which has
been a major body of literature in accounting for many years, starts
from the premise that many costs traditionally treated as fixed for
accounting purposes are in fact marginal. The district court ruled that
American's cost allocation scheme allocated these types of costs
"arbitrarily" across routes. It likely erred in making that judgment. The
choice of an allocation basis would almost certainly have been driven
by results about how different activities drive the level of expenditure
on different cost components.
Of course, none of these allocation schemes is perfect. Therefore,
reliance on them poses a risk of overestimating marginal cost.
However, if courts impose a very strict standard for justifying how
accounting fixed costs are allocated, the result will be a systematic
underestimation of incremental cost.
B. Spirit
The predatory pricing case by Spirit Airlines against Northwest
raised many of the same issues as the American Airlines case. 47
Northwest's cost accounting system seems to have been more
45. Adam Bryant, U.S. Airlines Finally Reach Cruising Speed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996,
§ 3, at 1; Agis Salpukas, A Struggle to Survive in the Air, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1983, § 3 at 1.
46. See David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence
From Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. REG. 37 (2005)
(discussing the costs and efficiencies of "tying"-selling a particular good only together with
another item).
47. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005).
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transparent. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did rule that a
reasonable jury could accept the cost estimates by Spirit's experts. 48
Indeed, there were some key points of agreement that were absent in
the American Airlines case. Both experts included airplane expense as
part of variable cost. Both agreed that the right cost concept was
average variable cost. 49
The agreement on this last point is particularly interesting. On one
level, the point should not be controversial, but there are two important
qualifications. First, all the economic variable costs, not just the ones
treated as variable, must be included. Second, the average must be
computed over the correct range. When firms increase output as part of
a predatory pricing scheme, the relevant range is the output increase.
The variable costs incurred to increase output should be averaged over
the amount of the increase.
The district court decision did mention a cost measure generated by
Northwest that included "long-term fixed costs that Northwest expects
to incur as it grows over time." 50 This wording is inherently imprecise.
The fact that the costs would grow over time with the level of output
means that the costs are not fixed according to the proper economic use
of that tern.5 1 They might be sunk costs, 52 and, if so, they should not
enter an average variable cost calculation directly. However, the
presence of sunk, nonfixed costs has implications for the average
variable cost.
There is a general principle in economics called the "envelope
theorem." 53  While it is (on one level) an abstract mathematical
principle, it is important enough to be illustrated in every introductory
microeconomics textbook. 54 The envelope theorem says that when the
level of output is equal to the level that was planned for (in making
capacity decisions), short-run marginal cost equals long-run marginal
cost. When output exceeds the level that was planned for, short-run
marginal cost (and, therefore, variable cost averaged over the output
increase) is greater than long-run marginal cost. Yet, average variable
48. Id. at 944.
49. Id. at 939-940.
50. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. 00-71535, 2003 WL 24197742, at *5
(E.D. Mich. March 31, 2003).
51. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANzAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 280 (1982).
52. Id.
53. HAL VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 70-71 (3d ed. 1992).
54. WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 39-43 (7th ed. 1998) (illustrating the
envelope theorem).
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cost as it is computed for antitrust cases is below what one would
estimate as long-run marginal cost. While some might argue that this is
appropriate because it reduces the likelihood of false positives, false
negatives have a cost as well. If they did not, then section 2 of the
Sherman Act should be interpreted as not applying to pricing at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
Matsushita used economics as a tool for reining in antitrust doctrine
that was too quick to label as anticompetitive the very conduct that the
antitrust laws are supposed to encourage. The case, however, left many
questions unanswered about exactly how economics should be used. In
the twenty years since Matsushita, economists have devoted a great deal
of effort to modeling the market settings under which predation might
occur. Properly understood, these models do not lead to the precise
predictions that courts might want in distinguishing between claims that
do and do not make economic sense. At the same time, economists
have neglected the question of how to measure costs in a way that
would allow an economist to conclude that a firm's pricing behavior has
a qualitative feature that could only be justified as an effort to exclude
competitors. Solving that problem is not easy, but progress on it is
possible, and better antitrust enforcement will be the result.
